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Abstract. Companies are under pressure to be in control of their assets but at
the same time they must operate as efficiently as possible. This means that they
aim to implement “good-enough security” but need to be able to justify their
security investment plans. In this paper, we present a Risk-Based Requirements
Prioritization method (RiskREP) that extends misuse case-based methods with
IT architecturebased risk assessment and countermeasure definition and
prioritization. Countermeasure prioritization is linked to business goals to
achieve and based on cost of countermeasures and their effectiveness in
reducing risks. RiskREP offers the potential to elicit complete security
countermeasures, but also supports the deliberate decision and documentation
of why the security analysis is focused on certain aspects. We illustrate
RiskREP by an application to an action case.
1   Introduction
Today, organizations are under high pressure to prove that they are in control of
their assets, which means among other things that they must prove that they
sufficiently secured their IT assets. At the same time, they are increasingly cost-
sensitive and hence they aim at reducing security risks in a cost-effective way. The
common solution is to use checklists to identify the largest risks and mitigate them.
How ever, checklists are based on past experience and are useful for achieving
consensus among experts, but do not necessarily provide justifications that are based
on business goals or technical characteristics of the system. Such ad hoc analyses are
risky in the face of current fast-changing information technology (IT) [9, 14]. We
propose a method that allows justification of security investments in terms of the
vulnerabilities of the business processes and the IT architecture in relation to the
business goals to be achieved.
Specification of misuse cases allows the specification of misuse threats [3, 6, 11,
13], but no method so far has added a link to business goals or countermeasure
specification. We build on current proposals for extending RE methods with security
risk assessment (RA) [2, 4, 8, 10, 12, 13]. (Interested readers may refer to [9] for an
overview of the related work.) We aim at deliberate focusing of the analysis on the
most important aspects and avoid applying inappropriate operations to scales like
multiplications of likelihood with impact and subtractions. For example, if likelihood
is estimated on an ordered, non-interval scale, then it makes no sense to add
likelihoods or multiply with impact but can only do comparisons.
RiskREP is built on the CRAC++ [9] and MOQARE [5] methods developed by the
authors. We present the metamodel of RiskREP in Section 2, present an action case in
section 3, and discuss lessons learned in Section 4.
2 Meta model of RiskREP
The meta model (Figure 1) contains concepts from three perspectives, i.e. the business
perspective, the user perspective and the technical perspective.
Figure 1: Meta-model showing the concepts and their interrelations.
Business perspective: Business goals are desired properties of the business.
Business goals justify system requirements. An example of business goal is “efficient
business processes”. A business damage is a state or activity of the business that
violates a business goal. The business damage completes the business view by asking
what should not happen. An example of business damage is “users don’t use the
system to be”. A quality goals are desired qualities of the IT system, i.e. a desired
state of the system. They are non-functional system goals that support business goals.
These goals are expressed as high-level quality requirements that consist of a quality
attribute and an asset, like “confidentiality of password”. They help to focus the
analysis of the quality of an IT system on the most important quality attributes. A
quality deficiency is a lack of quality attribute for an asset that violates quality goals
and might causes business damage.
User perspective: Quality attributes are attributes of the system to be protected.
They describe aspects or characteristics of quality, e.g. confidentiality. We use the
quality attributes of the ISO 9126 [1] and assume that these completely categorize all
relevant aspects of an IT systems quality. Assets are parts of the system that are
valuable for the organization, e.g. information, software, or hardware. They need to
be protected from malicious activities in order to achieve business goals. Value
quantifies the criticality of each quality goal with respect to the business. The value is
used to prioritize the quality goals against each other. It is determined by the impact
that the compromise of an asset would cause to the business.
Misuse Cases (MCs) [11] describe scenarios in which a threat agent can cause a
quality deficiency. The MC takes the perspective of the user and describes what
happens at the interface between user and system. They are identified by analyzing
the business process and the Use Cases of the system. The MCs are prioritized based
on their execution ease and the impact, which they cause to the asset(s). Threats are
actions, which cause a quality deficiency that causes the violation of a quality goal,
e.g. data theft violates the confidentiality of data. Vulnerabilities are a property of the
assets or the IT system or its environment that can be exploited by threat agents. This
exploitation could violate a quality goal. Vulnerabilities can be unwanted properties
like “lack of technical change management” or also wanted properties of the system
such as “Single-Sign On”. A threat agent is a person, i.e. an insider or an outsourcer
or an outsider that intentionally or unintentionally executes a threat. A threat agent
can be characterized in terms of his motivation, goal and attributes, e.g. disgruntled
employee.
Countermeasures are mitigation, detection or prevention mechanisms. They partly
or completely counteract a threat-vulnerability pair or the threat agent, and reduces
the estimated impact at threat/vulnerability and/or the ease of threat execution.
Countermeasures are expressed as quality requirements on the IT system. Cost is an
attribute of a countermeasure. It consists of implementation cost and the cost of
ownership. Depending on the depth of the assessment we either use partially ordered
scale or the real costs. In case the real costs are used then the risk expert may
calculate the implementation cost based on required hours and salary per hour. The
expected effectiveness of a countermeasure is given by the expected risk reduction it
achieves. Most countermeasures either influence the impact or the execution ease of
an IPP.
Technical perspective: Incident Propagation Paths (IPPs) are descriptions of MC
from the technical perspective. In some cases, an IPP consists of several
interconnected steps. That is a threat agent causing a quality deficiency on an asset by
executing one or more threats, which exploit vulnerabilities of several assets. Such
IPP scenarios are important for humans to imagine the flow of events including the
causes and consequences of incidents. Like the MCs, the IPPs are prioritized based on
their execution ease and the impact they have. There may be several IPPs realizing the
same MC. The execution ease of a MC is an estimation of the effort required to carry
out a MC. This effort is determined by the most resistant vulnerability that needs to be
exploited to carry out the MC. In our approach, the execution ease is considered to be
in correlation with the likelihood that a threat is actually executed by the “strongest”
threat agent. Impact is the damage caused to the assets by the execution of a MC.
3  Steps of the RiskREP method
The four steps of the method are:
1. Quality goal analysis: identify business goals, business damages, quality
deficiencies and quality goals;
2. Risk analysis: identify MC (threats, threat agents, vulnerabilities) and
estimate their impact on assets, and their ease of execution by means of
incident propagation paths;
3. Countermeasure definition: specify countermeasures and estimate their
cost;and
4. Countermeasure prioritization: assess effectiveness of countermeasure in
reducing MC risk, and their cost.
At each of these steps, it is possible to either analyse the complete system, all
business goals, all MC, respectively or to focus on the most important aspects.
RiskREP is currently supported by spreadsheet tables.
The information that the RiskREP method uses is elicited from three stakeholder
categories: business owner, IT manager and security officer who represent the
business, IT and user perspective, respectively. The method is executed by an RE
expert and a risk expert, who elicit the necessary information by semi-structured
interviews with the other stakeholders. We applied the method in the TUgether
project of the University Braunschweig (TU), in which a portal is developed to
provide all on-line services of the TU, such as email, library access, registration for
exams etc. available to students and employees. The portal must allow students to
sign-on via one individually configurable interface. One major objective is that all
students should eventually use the portal.
In the first phase of the project the portal framework product was selected which
satisfied requirements best. Eighty functional and non-functional requirements were
specified and about 70 products were considered. Our case study is restricted to the
eleven security requirements of the 80 requirements.
The TUgether project was at early development stage at the time we started
applying RiskREP to it. We received from the project team the complete requirements
specification. After analyzing it, we had several meetings with the project team to
elicit the information RiskREP uses, such as the IT architecture of the TUgether
portal. We concluded the action case by presenting the output of the method to the
business owner, IT manager and security officer in a meeting and asked their opinion
about the information RiskREP delivered. We now run through the steps of the
method.
Step 1: Quality goal analysis
We could infer the security-related business perspective concepts from a project
report which had been written before the case study. Figure 2 shows an extract of this
analysis. BG5, “gaining user acceptance”, is threatened by one business damage,
BD6, “Portal will not be used”. Three quality deficiencies may cause this, viz. User
unfriendliness (QD7), lack of trust (QD8), and lack of added value (QD9). Because of
the scope of our case study, we analyzed only QD8 further. QD8 can be avoided by
three high level quality goals, i.e. QG5: Confidentiality of assets, QG6: Integrity of
assets, and QG7: Availability of assets.
Figure 2: Business concepts elicites with RiskREP
Step 2: Risk analysis
The risk expert first identifies possible misuse cases (MC) that may threaten a quality
goal and estimate their impact on assets and ease of execution. In addition, the
security expert draws incident propagation paths (IPP) through the architecture that
connects entry points of the system to the MC. This allow us the estimation of the
ease of execution of the MC. Modeling the execution ease is also the main difference
between IPPs and Misuse Case Maps [7].
The risk expert also assesses the value of each quality goal, for example by using
value models for availability [14] or confidentiality [9] and then estimates the impact
or damage caused by the MC to these quality goals.
For example, in the case study, MC5 (Manipulation of account data) threatens QG6.
There are five threat agents, viz. user, hacker, portal admin, portal developer and
service developer. In the portal architecture (Figure 3 ), the critical IT assetsrelated to
MC5 are: TUgether portal server, LDAP server and Development server. We used a
scale from 1 (low) to 3 (high) to indicate execution ease and impact. (Due to space
restriction we cannot provide the description of the scales here.) The execution ease
of MC5 was estimated 1.5 and its impact was estimated 1. IPPs are described by the
MC here and therefore we did not draw them. In total, related to QG6, we identified
ten MCs, one of which we show in Table 1. As this table illustrates, the risk of a MC
is represented by a pair (ease of execution, impact on assets) where each of the two
components of risk has a totally ordered scale. This defines a partial ordering of MCs
according to their risk.
Figure 2: TUgether portals IT architecture. (FW: Firewall, DC: Data Center,
CAS: Central Authentication Service, SON: Personal Development Server.)
Step 3: Countermeasure definition.
The security officer and RE expert compose a set of countermeasures by taking
them from existing checklists. These checklists are part of RiskREP and contain
general countermeasures for 167 threatvulnerability pairs. In this step of RiskREP,
one brings these general measures to a concrete, realizable level by specifying which
component each of them applies to and how. Table 2 shows the results of this step on
our case. Cost estimations are indicated by a 0 (no cost), 1 (changing the settings of
applications), 2 (installing and maintaining freely available countermeasures) and 3
(purchasing, installing and maintaining countermeasures).
Table 1: Some MCs and their attributes.
MC ID risk
(ease,
impact)
Threat
agent
Threat Vulnerability
MC5:
manipulation
of account
data
(1.5,1) Hacker data get lost or are
manipulated during
transfer
Portal does not manage data
and therefore data
synchronization between
portal and services is
necessary
MC9: no
logout in
computer pool
(1,3) User does not log out after
having used the portal
on a computer in the
public computer pool
no access control to
computer pools
Step 4: Countermeasure prioritization
To prioritize countermeasures, their effectiveness in reducing the risk of MC must
be estimated. We define the impact of a countermeasure on a risk to be 0 if it neither
affects the impact nor the execution ease of an MC; 1 if it decreases either impact or
execution ease; and 2 if it decreases both.
Countermeasures interact with each other. For instance, some may be overlapping,
or diminish each others effectiveness. We documented the combined effect of pairs of
countermeasures for TUgether in a two dimensional matrix containing 10 interactions,
and discussed this with the security officer.
We now prioritize countermeasures according to their cost and effectiveness. Just
as for risk, no multiplications or additions can be done because the scales we use are
ordered, but neither interval nor ratio scales. The security objectives of companies and
their security strategies differ from each other. Therefore, RiskREP recommends to
define a company-specific heuristic for the countermeasure prioritization. In this case
study, we used categories of MC risks and countermeasures added values. For
instance, the MC category “frequent, but harmless” describes MC where ease is high,
but impact is low, and the the countermeasure category “low hanging fruit” contains
countermeasures where cost is 0, execution ease is reduced or impact is reduced or
both are reduced. We discussed the partial ordering of countermeasures according to
their cost and effectiveness with the stakeholders to reach an agreed prioritization.
The partial orderings or MCs by risk and of countermeasures by cost and
effectiveness provided the stakeholders with structured arguments for choosing a set
of countermeasures to implement
4 Analysis and discussion
Our action case study showed that RiskREP can be used and leads to a list of MC
partially ordered by risk, and motivated in terms of system architecture as well as
business goals. It also leads to a prioritized list of countermeasures agreed on by
stakeholders. It took us about four hours to apply RiskREP to one quality goal. This is
comparable to the time currently spent on security RE. So, we conclude that RiskREP
can be used within the available budget for security RE. But is it better than the
method currently in use? Did it lead to a better understanding of security risk and/or
to a better set of countermeasures, in terms of estimated cost and estimated
effectiveness? Before we applied RiskREP, the university was using a collection of
requirements grouped according to each attribute of the system. These requirements
were elicited from different stakeholders, and eleven high-level requirements were
about security. They were of different granularity levels, and it was neither possible to
compare their risk level, nor to validate their completeness. By contrast, RiskREP
systematically analyzes the risks both from user perspective and technical perspective
under consideration of all use cases and data flows. We argue that this an
improvement w.r.t. the current way of working. While RiskREP potentially could
elicit all security requirements completely, at each step it is possible to focus on the
most relevant aspects, e.g. most important quality goals, most important MC etc and
to document this descision. So, RiskREP supports also a light-weight analysis that is
focused on the most important elements. Comparing RiskREP to other security RE
methods we note that we do not use our ordered scales of MC (based on ease of
execution and impact on assets), cost and effectiveness in inadmissible ways, such as
by multiplying impact and ease of executing an IPP. This makes the results of using
our method more meaningful than the results of other methods. Assuming that in this
particular case study, RiskREP could be used and is an improvement, could it be used
in other cases, too? Would other people be able to use it with the same effectiveness
in other cases? RiskREP assumes that the information listed in the metamodel can be
elicited and that stakeholders are able to reach agreement about a countermeasure
prioritization in terms of their cost and effectiveness. However, for it to be used by
other requirements engineers than us, we need to supply RiskREP with tool support
and supporting manuals. We are planning to develop this in the near future.
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